
In Prosperity and Violence (1/3), we have seen that kinship-based agrarian societies, the precursors of the modern national state in the West, were (a) inherently restrained in terms of economic development. They were also (b) of highly fragile peaceableness. Both - (a) and (b) - were due in large measure to the inaptness of the private provision of coercion. The nature of coercion had to change for more advanced forms of civilization to emerge.
In Prosperity and Violence (2/3), we trace the development of Structures of Maximal Power as they developed in the feudal period and during the transition into the post-feudal world. The gains in economic efficiency achieved in the feudal period made it possible to enhance the military prowess of the manorial household. Especially when the economic boom induced by urbanisation fostered the commercialisation and thus higher levels of prosperity in the vast agricultural sector. The level of strife under the private provision of violence intensified and widened, setting in motion a new round of evolutionary competition among Structures of Maximal Power. The centralised, territorial or national state turned out to be the winner:
To pay for their wars, the heads of the ruling lineages broke into the strongholds of subjects to seize gold and jewels [...]They confiscated the wealth of their bankers, the estates of the church, and possessions of their aristocrats [...] To pay for their wars, the heads of ruling families also manipulated the rules of kinship." (p. 56/57)
However, in their insatiable quest for resources by which to finance their battles,
[...] in their efforts to prey upon the wealth of the urban centers, they found seduction preferable to bullying as a means of securing revenues. (p.57)
Endowed with superior wealth and greater numbers, the towns were in a position to marshal insurmountable defensive means (sophisticated fortifications, cannons etc.).
Not only was it therefore difficult to seize a town; but the benefits were few. Because of the mobility of urban assets, the physical seizure of the towns yielded few rewards. (p. 58)
[...] In the face of the urban economy, specialists in violence therefore had to alter their strategies for securing revenues [...] Rather than plundering wealth, they had to instead elicit its creation. They had to nurture, rather than to despoil, the new economy. They had to adopt policies that facilitated the growth of towns. (p. 58)
Necessitated by this impasse, mercantilism was resorted to, which
constituted a cluster of policies aimed at the promotion of urban manufacturing [and other urban interests] [...]
while, at the same time, constituting
[...] a means for paying for the king's wars. Powerful ties of self-interest ran from the making of wars to the search for revenues and thence to the promotion of urban-based economic activity. The desire to prevail - and the necessity of prevailing -in combat shaped the economic role of government in the development of Europe. (p.62)
Again:
The rise of manufacturing promoted the growth not only of towns, but also of rural economies. The increase in rural wealth produced in its train an increase in private violence, and the formation of private armies, led by rural elites, that sought to encroach upon the wealth of others. The demilitarization of these kinship groups took place when, on the one hand, rural dwellers came to demand it and, on the other, monarchs could afford to impose order. (p. 62/63)
As for the demand side:
With the commercialization of agriculture, land became valuable and fighting therefore increased; such conflicts once launched, were difficult to terminate. Fighting interrupted farming and destroyed crops, livestock, property, and human life. With the rise in demand for rural products, peace became increasingly valuable. (p.63)
Rural disarmament was at a premium, and in parallel a new concept of law and justice began to prevail:
Under the system of the feud, kin possessed a collective obligation to revenge wrongs inflicted upon one of their members; under the system advanced by the monarchs, they again bore collective responsibility, but now to surrender one of their members had he inflicted a wrong upon others [...] The new system [... resulted] not in reprisals and further fighting but in the apprehension of felons and their delivery to the courts of the kind." (p. 63/64)
Criminal law became separate from civil law:
The threat of revenge and physical reprisal had lain at the heart of the private provision of security. the redefinition of such acts as felonies thus signaled a fundamental recasting of the political system and a step in the direction of demilitarization of kin groups in rural communities. (p.64)
The monarch faced a gigantic task of demobilising kin groups and communities:
It was crucial that each [party] believe that the kind could, and would, hunt and harry those who might violate the peace. It was crucial that each party believe that the kind was so powerful that no one would emerge unscathed should he renege upon an agreement forged in the process of pacification.
With their growing access to the wealth of the new economy, monarchs were able to assemble armies of sufficient size and power to provide the assurances necessary to demilitarize kin groups and communities. While rural warlords may have been able to mobilize retainers, the monarch could pay for armies, train them, and keep them in the field. Private armies could feud; those of the monarch could campaign [...] [He had] the power to impose "the institution of the peace [gradually and enduringly throughout the territorial state]. (p.66)
In addition:
Replete with revenues, the court had become a fountain of privilege [...] By judiciously targeting favors, the monarch could make, or break, the fortunes of a clan head, and so render it in the interests of agrarian elites to withdraw from their rural redoubts and to attach themselves to the center. In this manner, too, kings secured the demobilization of the countryside. (p.66)
In conclusion:
In response to the demands for peace, monarchs transformed the local order, demilitarizing kinship, co-opting elites, and incorporating local communities into a system that terminated, rather than exacerbated, conflict. (p. 68) [...]
In historical Europe, then, states emerge from war. Governments pursued policies that promoted the development of the economy not because they wanted to but because they had to, the better to secure the resources with which to fight. As states developed, coercion did not disappear. Rather, when those who specialized in its use altered the purposes to which they employed it, coercion provided the political foundations for the great transformation. (p.69)
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